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Chern: Why Mandatory IOLTAs Should be Eliminated

WHY MANDATORY IOLTAS SHOULD
BE ELIMINATED
INTRODUCTION

The state's ability to find new ways to take the money of its citizens
should never be underestimated. One of the more curious methods of
state sponsored fund-raising (Read: taxes) comes from a program entitled Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts ("IOLTA"). The IOLTA, in
addition to being a tool for the funding of legal services to the indigent
and procuring various government benefits for the needy,1 also provides legal services for death-row inmates who wish to continue their
appeals as well as helping secure political asylum for those seeking
entry into the United States.2 In the fourteen year period between3
1981 to 1995, IOLTAs generated almost $945 million nationwide.
Texas alone, last year, collected over $10 million for such uses.
The collection of this money was not a result of any controversial
legislation; nor did the Governor expend political capital in raising the
money. Instead, the Texas Supreme Court mandated4 that attorneys
deposit their clients' funds into interest-bearing demand accounts.5
Forty-nine states, including Texas, have implemented the IOLTA
program.6 This program requires attorneys to deposit money given to
them by clients into interest-bearing accounts. The deposited money
must either be nominal in amount or held for a short term. Under the
various state bar rules of conduct, the attorney is required to decide
what constitutes "nominal" or "short term".' Once the money has
been classified as such, IOLTA mandates placing the money into an
interest-bearing, demand account. All interest earned on the pooled
money is then turned over to an organization (created either by the
1. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, art. 11, § 4(B)(C) (Vernon
1995).
2. See Frances A. McMorris, Ruling May Undermine Programs that Fund Legal
Services for Poor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1996, at B12.
3. See id.
4. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, art. 11, § 2 (Vernon 1995).
5. LAWRENCE S. WRIGHT & WILLIAM L. SILBER, PRINCIPLES OF MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 15-16 (7th ed. 1991). Interest-bearing demand ac-

counts are those accounts where a bank pays interest to the account; such interest is
normally calculated by multiplying a pre-determined rate by the size of the principal
and the amount of time that principal is left in the account. Thus, if the current annual interest rate is 5%, the principal is $1000 and the account is open for 6 months,
the interest would be figured in the following way: (0.05 x 1000) x 0.5. To say that an
account is a "demand" account means simply that the owner of the principal may
claim the money at any time without suffering monetary penalties. See id.
6. See In re Indiana State Bar Ass'n's Petition to Authorize a Program Governing
Interest on Lawyer's Trust Accounts, 550 N.E.2d 311, 311-13 (Ind. 1990).
7. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, art. 11, § 5(A) (Vernon
1995).
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state judiciary or the state bar),8 that in turn distributes the money to
various petitioning groups9 that seek to provide legal services to the
indigent, secure government benefits for the same (such as Social Security and Aid for Dependent Children), as well as provide money to
other non-profit causes. 10
Attorneys, clients, and various public-interest groups, most notably
the Washington Legal Foundation, a conservative think tank, have
challenged the constitutionality of the IOLTA program. Specifically,
challenging the program as an unconstitutional "taking" under the
Fifth Amendment." These various groups assert the use of the money
is both unauthorized and uncompensated. This Comment's primary
topic is centered on a threshold issue for a takings claim: whether a
client's property right attaches to interest earned on principal-principal that the state requires an attorney place into an interest-bearing
account. As of this writing, three federal circuits12 have dealt with this
threshold issue.
The First and Eleventh Circuits have held that clients have no property right in interest earned through the IOLTA program. Contrary to
both holdings, the Fifth Circuit found that clients do have a property
right in this interest. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit's opinion consists almost entirely of a critique of these two contrary holdings. Curiously,
all three circuits rely on the same United States Supreme Court case,
Webb's FabulousPharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith. 3 This Comment concludes that the Fifth Circuit correctly applied Webb's in holding that
the owner of principal has a property right in the interest earned on
that principal.
I.

AN EXPLICATION OF RELEVANT CASES

A. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith
The Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith 4 case found its
way to the United States Supreme Court on an appeal from a Florida
Supreme Court ruling.' 5 Eckerd, the appellant, purchased the assets
8. See id. § 3(A).
9. See id. § 4(G). This section requires that any organization receiving funds
must provide "reports as to the actual use of funds and for audit of the reports." Id.
10. See id. § 4(F).
11. These organizations have also challenged IOLTA on the basis of First Amend-

ment violations. For a full discussion of First Amendment issues, as they relate to
mandatory IOLTAs, see Risa I. Sackmary, Comment, IOLTA's Last Obstacle: Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation'sFaulty Analysis of Attorney's First Amendment Rights, 2 J.L. & POL'Y 187 (1994).
12. See Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d
996 (5th Cir. 1996); Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d
962 (1st Cir. 1993); Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987).
13. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
14. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
15. See Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1979),
rev'd, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that "the statute
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of Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies ("Webb's") for $1.8 million. At the
closing, Eckerd discovered Webb's debts were greater than the

purchase price. Seeking state statutory protection from Webb's creditors, Eckerd tendered the purchase price to the Circuit Court of Seminole County, Florida, interpleading both Webb's and its creditors as

defendants. 6 Florida law requires not only that the $1.8 million be
delivered to the court clerk but also that it be deposited in an interestbearing account.17 In addition to receiving the interest from monies
directs the court clerk to detendered to the court, Florida law also
8
rendered.'
"services
for
fee
duct a
Approximately one year after the tender of money into the court,
the circuit court appointed a receiver for Webb's. The receiver then
petitioned the court for the interest that had accrued on the $1.8 mil-

lion. The interest retained by the court clerk amounted to more than
$100,000."9 The receiver moved to have the interest returned to it for

the purpose of paying creditors. 20 The court clerk refused. The circuit

court found for the receiver and ordered the clerk to transfer the in-

terest. 21 The clerk appealed to the Florida District Court of Appeal,

maintaining that the interest, under Florida law, belonged to the

court.22 The District Court of Appeal transferred the case to the Florida Supreme Court.23 The Florida Supreme Court held for the court
clerk.24 The receiver and creditors subsequently appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.

takes only what it creates." Id. at 953. This "creation" occurs when the funds are
deposited with the court clerk. The court reasons that the funds, at the time they are
deposited, are no longer private property. See id. at 952 (citing Money v. State ex rel.
Florida First Nat'l Bank, 206 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 219.01(2) (West 1977). The statute the court refers to, Florida Statute § 28.33, directs the court clerk to deposit any money received in its (the court's) registry into
interest-bearing certificates. See id. The statute goes on to say, "all interest accruing
from moneys deposited shall be deemed income of the office of the clerk of the circuit
court investing such moneys and shall be deposited in the same account as are other
fees and commissions of the clerk's office." Id.
16. See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 157.

17. See

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 28.33 (West 1977).

18. See id. § 28.24.
19. See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 158.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951, 953 (Fla.
1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that the interest earned is created by the relevant state statute. This creation of wealth occurs,
according to the court, when private money is deposited with the court clerk. Once
deposited, the money may then be considered public money. As public money, any
interest earned on it may be used for the "benefit of all the people." Id.
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The Court began by stating the purpose of its analysis: whether the
"second exaction" 25-the keeping of the interest-amounted to a taking. 1 In order to make such a determination, the Court began its investigation as to whether there was a property right in the earned
interest, reasoning that where there is no property, there can be no
taking.
The Court recognized that the principal was private property, and
as the appellees noted, the Constitution is not the creator of private
property or property rights. Rather, the boundaries of property rights
are created by an "independent source such as state law."' 27 The
Court then set boundaries of its own to the creation of property rights
by saying that "a mere unilateral expectation 2or
an abstract need is
8
not a property interest entitled to protection.
The Court stated the principal was held for the "ultimate benefit of
Webb's creditors, not for the benefit of the court and not for the benefit of the county. ' 29 Thus, those creditors had more than a "unilateral
expectation" to the principal.
Once Eckerd deposited the purchase price for the assets of Webb's
with the state court, and interplead not only Webb's, but also Webb's
creditors, those creditors had a state-created property interest in the
fund (the principal). The Court reasoned that as the creditors' expectations were not merely unilateral, those creditors had a "state-created property right to their respective portions of the fund[,]" 3 0 the
initial principal and the earned interest. The property interest was
not, however, an immediate one. The creditors had no right to the
fund when it was initially deposited by Eckerd. Instead, the creditors
would (and did) have to wait for the court-appointed receiver to distribute the fund.31
The relationship between when a property right is created in interest earned on principal and whether a party has a claim in the interest
earned on that principal was discussed by the Court:
That lack of immediate right, however, does not automatically bar a
claimant ultimately determined to be entitled to all or a share of the
fund from claiming a proper share of the interest, the fruit of the

fund's use, that is realized in the interim. To be sure, § 28.33 establishes as a matter of Florida law that interest is to be earned on
deposited funds. But the State's having mandated the accrual of

25. The first exacting came from the Florida statute authorizing the court clerk to
deduct pre-determined fees for the holding of money. See id. at 952.
26. See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 160.
27. Id. at 161 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
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interest does not mean the State
32 or its designate is entitled to assume ownership of the interest.
What then would justify the State (or one of its designees) from
"assuming ownership of interest?" The Court answers indirectly by
saying it has allowed the adjusting of "benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." 33 The government may be

allowed to promote its interests through denying "the property owner
of some beneficial use of his property or ... restrict the owner's full

exploitation of the property, if such public action is justified as promoting the general welfare." 3 4

In Webb's, the Court further said that the shouldering of such "pubbe borne "in all fairness and justice" by the
lic burdens" should often
"public as a whole.",35 The State, however, sought to enhance its general revenues, "not reasonably related to the costs of using the
courts,"3 6 through a "forced contribution., 37 This "forced contribution" was exacted at the expense of the primary beneficiary of the
fund, the creditors, by keeping the interest earned on that fund.
The Florida Supreme Court had reasoned that since the court clerk
would have no authority to invest the funds without the relevant state
statute, s those funds, because of this statute, temporarily assumed the
status of public money.3 9 The United States Supreme Court rejected
that reasoning, and stated:
The earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself
and are property just as the fund itself is property. The state statute
has the practical effect of appropriating for the county the value of
the use of the fund for the period in which it is held in the registry.4 °

The characterization of the fund (principal) as "public money" is not
sufficient to justify public use of the interest earned on the fund.41
Thus, the Court implied that it would be willing to allow the state to
deny the owner of the principal the full exploitation of the principal if
the state could show that such a denial would (1) promote the general
welfare, and (2) that such promotion should not in "fairness and jus32. Id. at 162 (emphasis added). The "right" the Court speaks of is the right to
claim ownership in the funds being held by the court clerk. The claim is not immediate as the receiver was not free to distribute any funds to the creditor prior to the
resolution of any and all claims. See id. at 161.
33. Id. at 163 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
34. Id.

35. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See FLA. STAT.

39.
1979),
Bank,
40.

ANN. § 28.33 (West 1977).
See Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla.
rev'd, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). See also Money v. State ex rel. Florida First Nat'l
206 So. 2d 436, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164.

41. See id.
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tice" be borne exclusively by some members of the public
(the owners
42
of principal) but instead by the "public as a whole.
Almost seven years after Webb's holding, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a property interest attaches to interest
earned on principle. For reasons that will be made clear later in this
paper, the Eleventh Circuit disregarded the basic thrust of the
Supreme Court's holding in Webb's.
B.

Cone v. State Bar of Florida

The Eleventh Circuit, in Cone v. State Bar of Florida,4 3 found that a
program in Florida similar to IOLTAs was valid. In February 1969, a
client paid a fee deposit of $100 to a Florida law firm.4 The firm
deposited the money in a non-interest bearing trust account.45 The
firm's representation of this client ended in 1970.46 The firm, however, inadvertently failed to remit the remaining $13.75 to the client
until September 1984. 47 Prior to this return, the Florida Supreme
Court approved an Interest On Trust Account ("IOTA") program.48
As the court observed, this program "authorized, but did not require"
placement of "nominal or short term funds into pooled, interest-bearing accounts[.] ' 49 The interest was turned over to the Florida Bar

Foundation where the money was distributed to various charitable
purposes.5 °
In the three years that the $13.75 remained in an IOTA, $2.25 in
interest was generated. 5 ' The law firm, having discovered its error,
returned the $13.75, but deposited the interest with the Florida Bar
Foundation (the designated receiver for the IOTA program). The client filed suit claiming the appropriation of interest earned on her principal and that of other similarly situated clients constituted an
improper taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.52

The majority pointed out that in order for a person to have a constitutionally protected property interest, that person must have a "specific and legitimate 'claim of entitlement."' 53 Further, such claim of
entitlement must be based on "positive rules of substantive law or mu42. Id. at 163.
43. 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987).

44. See id. at 1003.
45. See id. at 1003-04.
46. See id. at 1004.
47. See id.

48. See id.
49. Id.
50. See id.

51. See id.
52. See Cone, 819 F.2d at 1004.
53. Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol4/iss1/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V4.I1.5

6

Chern: Why Mandatory IOLTAs Should be Eliminated

19971

WHY IOLTAS SHOULD BE ELIMINATED

tually explicit understandings."54 The lower court held that the plaintiff could not show such a claim.55 The appellate court agreed with the
lower court, stating the $13.75 was insufficient to produce interest net
of expenses.56 A combination of three factors acted to keep the
$13.75 from earning interest net of expenses: (1) Florida's ethical requirements that forbid commingling of attorney and client funds, (2)
the economics of running an interest-bearing demand account, and (3)
the federal restrictions on who may utilize interest-producing demand
accounts.57 While there are numerous federal banking regulations
concerning what are and are not appropriate accounts for various
groups of consumers, the relevant law here 58 does not permit partnerships to maintain interest bearing checking accounts (the law firm in
this case was a partnership). The Negotiable Order of Withdrawal
("NOW") accounts permit banks to maintain interest-bearing checking accounts. The NOW account was created by federal law in the
early 1980s. 59 The court reasoned that if the principal could never
earn interest, the client could not have an expectation or claim of entitlement to any interest.6 °
Cone distinguished the Webb's decision by emphasizing that the
Florida county in Webb's sought to use the net value of the fund6 1
during the time the fund was held in the registry. Here, however,
there was no "net value" on the $13.75. That is, under current banking law, coupled with the cost of maintaining an interest-bearing demand account, there could be no net gain to the owner of the
principal.62 The court further reasoned that it is only through the
IOTA and the pooling of such short-term or nominal funds that interest net of expenses could be generated. An individual client, with
such a short-term or nominal fund would, therefore, have no legitimate expectation of property.63

54. Id. (citing Perry v. Indermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972)).
55. See id. at 1005-07.
56. See id. at 1006. "Interest net of expenses" is a technical way of saying that an
account has earned more money through interest than that same account was charged
with various administrative fees. For example, if a bank were to charge an account

holder $10 a year for maintaining an account and that same account, during that same
year, earned $15 in interest, the account holder would have earned $5 on that account:

interest net of expenses.
57. See id. at 1005.
58. See 12 C.F.R. § 217.157 (1980).

59. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
12 U.S.C. § 1832 (1980).

60. See Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007.
61. See id. (The "net value of the fund" refers to the proceeds (the interest)
earned on the principal while it was held by the county clerk.).
62. See Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007.
63. See id.
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C. Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation
In 1989, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Washington Legal
Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation,64 converted the IOLTA
program from a voluntary to a mandatory one, as long as a client's
funds were nominal in amount or to be held for a short period of
time.65 The court pointed out that earlier banking laws, coupled with
ethical obligations of lawyers to maintain a client's funds in such a way
that those funds are immediately available for the client, prevented
such pooled trust accounts from ever accruing interest 66 The court
recognized that the principal was private property and "must be returned to the clients at their request., 67 The clients sought protection
of the use of their principal by drawing analogies to the protection
afforded real property; that is, the plaintiffs sought to exclude others
from the beneficial use of their funds while deposited in an interestbearing account.68
The court analyzed the plaintiffs' takings claim by looking at the
following three factors: "'(1) "the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant"; (2) "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations"; and (3) "the
character of the governmental action.' ,,69. The court stated that the
government may "adjust rights and economic interests among people
for the public good, as long as the government does not force 'some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."' 70
The court reasoned that, unlike Webb's, the plaintiffs made no claim
of ownership on the interest earned from their respective principal.7 '
Instead, the plaintiffs asserted that the property interest in the principal should permit them to exclude the government from making a
beneficial use of that property.72 The plaintiffs sought protection by
pointing to an analogy the Webb's Court makes: In Webb's, the
Supreme Court pointed out that the plaintiffs had a cognizable and
therefore "protectable" property right in the interest earned on the
fund deposited with the court. That is, the interest existed and was
being held by the court. The Webb's Court likened the county's use of
64. 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1993).
65. See id. at 980.
66. See id. at 968. With the advent of the NOW account, such interest-bearing
accounts became possible. See id.
67. See id. at 973.
68. See id. at 974.
69. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124

(1978)).
70. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).

71. See id. at 975-76.
72. See id. at 975.
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the fund to generate interest to the government's use of a private citizen's air space.73
. Here, the court reasoned, no such analogy could be found. As the
plaintiffs claimed no property right in the earned interest, the right of
exclusion was an intangible right. Intangible rights, the court stated,
were not afforded the same protection(s) afforded real property. As
such, the plaintiff's analogy to Webb's was unfounded. 74 The only interference the plaintiffs could assert then was interference with the
principal.
The interference, to constitute a taking, must be significant. 75 As
the principal was always available to the client, there was no interference with the clients' property interest. 76 Further, with no interference with the fund itself, and no expectation of interest, the client had
no "investment-backed" expectations.77 Under these circumstances,
the clients had no economic interest in the funds in question. As such,
they were not in a position to argue that they should be allowed to
exclude others in order to protect their economic interest.78
D. Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to
Justice Foundation
In 1988, the Texas Supreme Court in Washington Legal Foundation
v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation,79 like the Massachusetts
Bar, made participation in the IOLTA program mandatory.8" Such
accounts were created to hold the pooled funds of clients whose
money was either nominal in amount or to be held for a short time.
While in the account, the pooled money collected interest. The interest was then turned over to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation ("TEAJF"). 8'1
Like both Cone and Massachusetts Bar Foundation, the defenders
of the IOLTA program (the defendants) argued that the interest was
created by current banking regulations and current ethical guidelines
of the legal profession.82 The defendants further argued that IOLTA
provides the (legal) collection of interest, and that without such a program, no interest would exist.83
73.
(citing
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-64 (1980)
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 976.
See id. (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979)).
See id.
See id.
See id.
94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 999. See also Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 968.
See Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 998.
See id. at 1000.
See id.
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Unlike both Cone and MassachusettsBar Foundation, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the defendants and found instead that the clients
have a cognizable property right in the interest earned from their principal.8 4 The court reasoned that, like Webb's, the principal was held
for the ultimate benefit of the client; 85 that the interest was the "fruit"
of the principal and that "simply because the state ordered the placement of interpleaded funds into an interest-bearing account
does not
86
mean that the state can assert ownership of that interest.
The court went on to attack both the Eleventh and First Circuits'
reasoning. The Eleventh Circuit, the court asserted, found Webb's to
be inapposite due to the size of the money involved.8 7 The court then
pointed to the Eleventh Circuit's discussion of "legitimate expectation., 8 8 With no possibility of earning interest net of expenses, there
could be no expectation of interest. By implication, the Eleventh Circuit found that the value (or size) of property determines whether a
person had a cognizable, "protectable" interest in that property.89
The Fifth Circuit continued its analysis by pointing out that interest
accrues to principal prior to any deduction of service fees. 90 Once the
interest accrues, a property interest attaches, regardless of what fees a
bank might then charge. 91 In addition, the very rule which made the
IOLTA program possible confounds the reasoning of Cone: In response to attorneys concerned about their clients' tax liability on
earned-interest, the IRS issued a ruling' that if clients have control
over earned interest, those clients are liable for the tax on that interest.9 3 In response to this interpretive ruling, Texas, as well as the
other participating states, created "an IOLTA monopoly, reserving all
the IOLTA interest proceeds for itself and requiring all of its attorneys
to participate in the program." 94 Such a monopoly removes not only
any control the client has over the interest but also any tax liability the
client might face with the earning of interest. To show the potential
inconsistencies that these facts, coupled with the holding of Cone,
would lead to, the court posited the existence of private charities setting up their own IOLTA programs, whereby people with nominal or
84. See id. at 1004.
85. See id. at 1000.
86. Id. at 1001.
87. See Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1001. In Webb's, the earned interest
amounted to over $100,000, unlike the Eleventh Circuit's $2.25 earned interest. See
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 157 (1980).
88. See Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1002.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 1003. "As a result, a property interest attaches the moment that the

interest accrues, from which the bank then deducts its charges from the depositor's
account." Id.
91. See id.

92. See Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 17.
93. See Washington Legal Found., 94 F.3d at 1002.
94. Id. at 1003.
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short-term funds could choose the charity to which their funds would
go. Under such a scenario, the Cone court would say that, based on
size, there is no property interest, while at the same time the IRS ruling would require the donating party to pay taxes on that which is not
a property interest.95 The client would then be left in the curious position of owing taxes on that in which he had no property interest. Such
a result is not merely inequitable and unjust, it is simply bad legal
reasoning.
II.
A.

AN ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT CASES

The Failure of the First and Eleventh Circuits in Their Reading
and Application of Webb's Pharmacies

For Cone and Massachusetts Bar Foundation, the value of property
determines whether or not a property right attaches. In both cases,
the courts held the clients did not have a legitimate expectation of
property. The reasoning supporting this conclusion was the money in
question could not have earned interest above administrative costs
without being pooled with money from other clients. This argument
from net value96 demands that principal yield profit, net profit, in order for the owner of the principal to have a legitimate expectation of
property rights in any use of the principal. Thus, if principal standing
on its own could yield no net profit due to the costs of maintaining
such an account at the current interest rate and administrative costs,
the owner of the principal could never have an expectation of property. Such an argument relegates the foundation of property rights to
an issue of banking regulations, finance, and accounting. 97
Should the interest rates increase from day one of the owner's deposit of principal to day two, what was an unrecognizable, unprotectable property right would suddenly be recognizable and protected.
An increase in the interest rate would potentially leave more interest
than the administrative costs would have subtracted away, thus leaving net value in the fund. Under the First and Eleventh Circuits' reasoning, such a result would create a "legitimate expectation" to the
95. See id.

96. This author has, for ease of reference, coined this term. The argument from
net value, as utilized by the First and Eleventh Circuits, demands that a person's
money be used profitably for that person to assert a property interest over that
money. See generally Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002, 1006 (11th Cir.
1987) (noting that administrative costs and bank charges associated with an interestbearing account would exceed the interest generated by the appellant's $13.75 deposit); Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 976 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The property
rights claimed by the plaintiffs do not involve clients' economic interests .... [C]lients
would not otherwise be entitled to interest earned on pooled accounts .... [T]here
are no 'investment-backed' expectations in the claimed rights of clients . . . under
these circumstances.").
97. The Fifth Circuit adds to this list the "fickle tax code." See Washington Legal
Found., 94 F.3d at 1004 n.47.
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interest. Should the fees a bank charges for account management decrease over some period of time, what was once a non-existent property right would turn into a legitimate expectation of property. Are
the daily fluctuations of interest and the ever-changing bank regulations controlling factors determining when an owner may hope for
legal protection of property? The United States Supreme Court has
held that property rights are the creation of state substantive law.9 8
The supporters of IOLTA offer no reason why this should change.
The argument from net value also relies on the specific rule of professional ethics, current banking regulations,99 and a current IRS interpretive rule. 100 First, attorneys are permitted to pool clients'
money together but may not commingle their own money with the
clients' money. Second, federal banking regulations noted above permit the payment of interest on demand accounts only for individuals
or non-profit business; in short, for-profit business are not entitled to
these interest bearing demand accounts. Third, the IRS interpretive
ruling noted above has deemed owners' of principal to be tax exempt
when they have no control over the interest.
The argument from net value surveys these three regulations and
declares that, because of these state/federal-mandated rules, no client
(whose principal is either nominal in amount or to be held for a shortterm period) could ever expect to earn interest.' 0 ' Specifically, the
first two combine, the argument goes, to say that since this nominal or
short term principal can only be combined with other clients' nominal
or short term interest, no individual client could expect to earn interest-net of expenses. Further, since the pooling of the clients' funds
were mandated by the state, and not by any agreement between the
clients, the state is the only entity entitled to the interest.
The IRS ruling, the argument continues, allows the state to declare
itself the sole receiver of the interest-thereby avoiding any tax liability to the client. The net result of this IRS ruling is to point to another
instance of the owner's lack of property right in any interest derived
from their principal. Since the IRS does not require the owner of
principal to pay taxes on the interest earned from their principal, then
98. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
99. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (1989). This Act permits NOW accounts to "consist of commingled funds belonging to numerous individuals or non-profit organizations or
both." Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996,
998 (5th Cir. 1996).
100. See Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16. This ruling states that individual clients

are exempt from paying taxes on interest from IOLTAs.
101. In Cone, Massachusetts Bar Foundation, and Washington Legal Foundation,

the supporters of IOLTAs have asserted that the state is only taking that which it has
created. For ease of discussion, this Comment refers to the supporters of IOLTAs
collectively.
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they (the clients) have no property right in the interest-under the
10 2
unstated premises of that which is not taxed can not be property.
What such reasoning amounts to-and what the defendants in
Washington Legal Foundation asserted-is that the state has earned
this interest; that the owner of principal could not have earned any
interest, and that the owner may not come in after such an earning
and demand a share in that which they did not create. To support
such reasoning, both Cone10 3 and MassachusettsBar Foundation10 4 as-

sert the deposits of a client's principal in an interest-bearing account
and the state's use of that interest, are not covered in Webb's.
Whether the supporters of the IOLTA program admit it or not, the
unwillingness to see Webb's as controlling could come only by considering whether the principal earned interest above the cost(s) of maintaining that principal in an interest-bearing account.
Yet Webb's states that a statute requiring placing money in an interest-bearing account does not provide any basis for the state claiming a
right to that interest.'015 Neither Cone nor Massachusetts Bar Foundation offers any reasoning why a combination of statutes and rules
should provide the state with such a right where a statute alone would
not. Yet both circuit decisions held that such a right is established
through the net value argument.
Webb's, however, explicitly stated that "the state statute has the
use of
practical effect of appropriating for the county the value of10the
6
the fund for the period in which it is held in the registry.'
Both circuits found themselves exempt from this statement since
the statute and rules that led to the IOLTA program permit only nominal amounts of money to be pooled together. It is this requirement,
the pooling of monies, that these circuits relied on to set them free of
a Supreme Court ruling. Both circuits argued that since the state required pooling of money, the state may demand the result of such
pooling, with the added caveat that had it not been for such statutes
and rules, there would be no interest. The same, however, may be
said of Webb's: A state statute required the court clerk to deposit
money turned over to the court in an interest-bearing account and for
the clerk to then turn the interest over to the county. Without such a
requirement, there would have been no accrued interest in Webb's.
102. IOLTA supporters would no doubt agree that a person would have a recognizable property interest in various sources of non-taxable income. The absence of a tax
would not be justification for denying someone the right to bring suit in protection of
municipal bonds, or income realized from the sale of a home.
103. See Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007.
104. See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 975.
105. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162 (1980).

"To be sure, § 28.33 establishes as a matter of Florida law that interest is to be earned
on deposited funds. But the State's having mandated the accrual of interest does not
mean the State or its designate is entitled to assume ownership of the interest." Id.

106. Id. at 164.
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Neither circuit provided a reason why such a statutory requirement
should not be cited as a justification for the state keeping that interest;
had it not been for the relevant statute, the principal would have
never been deposited, and the interest would never have been earned.
B.

Where Ownership and-Statutes Collide

That the supporters of IOLTA can point to a combination of statutes and rules that require the pooling of client money is irrelevant to
an analysis of whether the owner of principal has a property interest
in any money created by that principal. As Webb's points out, where a
person is entitled to a portion of principal, that person is also entitled
to "a proper share of the interest.' 10 7 Nowhere in the Supreme
Court's analysis is the amount of principal that a person may be entitled to relevant in determining if that person has an interest in proceeds generated from that principal. Yet Cone states, "the crucial
distinction is not the amount of interest earned, but that the circumstances led to a legitimate expectation of interest exclusive of administrative costs and expenses.' ' 10 8 The circumstances Cone speaks of are
the statute that required the court clerk to place money into an interest-bearing account, and the amount of interest that would accrue to
the deposited fund.' °9 While the Cone court claims to be unconcerned
with the amount of interest earned, it approvingly cites the lower
court's holding that the use of a client's money that had "no net
value" could have no property interest for that client.1 0 In other
words, had the principal been greater, the client would have had a
property right in the earned interest. Contrary to what the court says,
it effectively established a de minimis standard in dealing with a Fifth
Amendment taking. The Cone court missed the United States
Supreme Court's central point in Webb's: Interest does not exist without principal.'' Further, compelling people to pool their money together does not alter this essential economic fact." 2
Cone also dismissed any similarities between Webb's reliance on
United States v. Causby" 3 and the IOLTA program. Webb's found
Causby analogous to the facts before it since "Causby emphasized that
107. Id. at 162.
108. Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002, 1007 (11th Cir. 1987).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 162.
112. See id.
113. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). The Court reasoned that over-flights by U.S. aircraft constituted a taking of property. The government maintained that as the over-flights did
not destroy the value of the land, there was no taking. The Supreme Court disagreed,
saying, "The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable factory site to grazing
land, an orchard to a vegetable patch, a residential section to a wheat field. Some
value would remain. But the use of the airspace immediately above the land would
limit the utility of the land and cause a diminution in its value." Id. at 1006.
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Government had not 'merely destroyed property [but was] using a
part of it for the flight of its planes."1 14 The government's use of
15
property, not merely its destruction, is what Webb's emphasized,'
while Cone insisted that the high court said the opposite. 116 Appellants were correct, under both Causby and Webb's reliance on Causby,
that the government may not make (an uncompensated) use of private
property.
The IOLTA programs make use of private property in a fashion
prohibited by both Supreme Court holdings in Causby and Webb's.
Once the state requires attorneys to deposit money in an interestbearing account, any further requirement by the state that it take the
interest is a use of that money. The IOLTA program treats not merely
money but ownership of money as if it was of a fungible quality. That
is, since one piece of money is interchangeable with another, the control of that money is equally interchangeable; and since the owner of
one of those pieces of money had no legitimate expectation of interest, neither do the owners, en mass. For the supporters of IOLTA,
forcing clients to pool their money relieves them of ownership of that
money. The argument seems to find some magical quality in herding
clients into a financial collective: If you (the owner) cannot tell which
$20 bill is yours, you may not claim control over any of the $20 bills.
The Fifth Circuit appropriately characterizes the supporters of
IOLTA's argument as a modern day alchemists. "The alchemists
failed because the necessary ingredients for their magic did not exist
in historical times: the combinations of attorney's client funds and
anomalies in modern banking regulations""' 7 is the magic formula for
turning lead into gold. While Cone and MassachusettsBar Foundation
treat the principal as being pooled they both seem to treat the ownership as being laid out side-by-side in some abstract juxtaposition of
ownerships. That is, money may be combined but rights of ownership
may not.
When monies from individual clients are combined, the owners of
the principal become the owners in toto of the fund. Any use of that
fund is a use of all the property-property that has discreet, distinct
owners. As Webb's points out, the lack of an immediate right does not
automatically bar the parties from claiming ownership over the "fruit
114. Webb's, 449 U.S. at 164 (alteration in original).
115. See id.
116. Cone, 819 F.2d at 1007 n.9. The Cone court believes that the destruction of
property (a chicken farmer's inability to raise chickens because of aircraft noise) is
central to the holding in Causby. See id. Yet Causby explicitly states that the taking
does not occur because of any "incidental damages." See Causby, 328 U.S. at 262.
This author does not mean to assert that the Court did not speak of a destruction of
the use of the land. Rather, the salient point is that the government's actions lessened
the value, i.e., the potential uses the owner could make of the land.
117. Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996,
1000 (5th Cir. 1996).
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of the funds use."11 8 The cause(s) of a delay in an "immediate claim"
is irrelevant in determining whether a property interest exists. Similarly, prior to the withdrawal of a client's individual principal, that
client may not have an immediate right to the interest his principal
helped to create. Yet, once the principal is withdrawn, the client is not
automatically barred from "claiming a proper share of the interest.""' 9
Cone and Massachusetts Bar Foundation have erroneously held
otherwise.
C.

A Lack of Consistency

The supporters of IOLTAs will undoubtably continue to push their
forced charity on other professions as well. Perhaps the payment of
insurance may become a source of funds for other IOLTA-like programs. An individual normally pays an insurance premium at the beginning of a month or some other pre-determined period. Such a
premium "carries" that person through to the end of the month. A
monthly insurance premium of $100 amounts to a person paying $3.33
a day. The insurance company, in effect, "deducts" this $3.33 every
day from its customer's payment of $100. This daily deduction leaves
a balance that provides the insurance company with an interest-free
loan. Under the logic of the IOLTA program, insurance companies
should be compelled to place these funds into an interest-bearing account. Once a given amount of interest has accrued, such proceeds
might then be turned over to an organization that disperses such funds
to those unable to afford medical care. Such funds could be used for
remedial check-ups and vaccinations. Should such funds be used for
abortions or other controversial medical procedures, the supporters of
IOLTA might tell us that those who deposited the money (the customers of the insurance companies) had no legitimate expectation of interest from such money. Further, since the principal is still being used
to finance the customer's insurance needs, the customer's property
(the fund) and the insurance coverage are not being destroyed. Since
there is no destruction of this property and the customer had no expectation of earned interest, the customer may not seek compensation
for the use of his fund, regardless of either how much, or how little,
money is generated from the customers' fund or how disagreeable the
use of such money may be to a particular customer.
We could of course apply this logic to any field where people do not
have the same access to goods and/or services as others. Those who
lack auto insurance might be provided with such insurance by compelling the auto insurance industry to combine such money into interestbearing accounts. Such an application would create (or at least further) a class division made up of those who provide and those who
118. See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 162.
119. See id.
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receive. Of course, the incentive to actually pay for one's own product/service would be greatly reduced.
The supporters of IOLTAs apparently see nothing wrong with such
logic. The use of another's money presents no problem to those who
see ownership as some sort of ephemeral concept that loosely hovers
over an object. They see no loss of money to either lawyers, clients, or
banks through such programs. For these individuals, ownership may
be shifted from one person or group (the clients) to any other person
or group (the TEAJF) without consent of the original owners and
without the necessity of trade between the group who provides the
benefit and the group who receives the benefit. The IOLTA supporters would perhaps respond by asserting that the "contributing" group
has, in fact, provided nothing; the various banking regulations have
done the real work. Yet if all the capital, however great or modest in
amount, were removed from these IOLTAs, all the banking regulations now in existence would not produce one cent of revenue for
these programs. Such matters will probably not deter those who seek
to be virtuous with other people's money.
D.

A Lack of Justification

The justification offered for such use is need, the need of whatever
group currently enjoys the political spotlight. 2 ° The use of need as a
justification would seem to suggest a certain intellectual bankruptcy in
finding any justifiable basis for such programs. All persons have various needs. If the supporters of IOLTAs believe an organizing principal of American law is, or should be, the providing of such needs
through the uncompensated use of other people's money, let them
stand up and say as much.
Of course, the investigation of ethical formulations begins to exceed
the scope of this paper. Presumably, this is true of the various articles,
and commentators supporting the IOLTAs.' 21 Yet, the introduction of
such issues into this area would provide both sides a more explicit and
cogent statement of where they believe the law currently is and where
it should be going. Yet, the act of naming the principle(s) one stands
120. See Betsy Borden Johnson, Comment, "With Liberty and Justice for All"
IOLTA in Texas-The Texas Equal Access to Justice System, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 725
(1985). See also Kenneth Paul Kreider, Note, Florida's IOLTA Program Does Not
"Take" Client Property For Public Use: Cone v. State Bar of Florida, 819 F.2d 1002
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 268 (1987), 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 369 (1.988) (discussing the reasoning used by the courts and legislatures of states that have adopted
IOLTA programs to resolve problematic issues of banking regulations, taxation and
ethics when authorizing the program as a source of legal aid funds for the public
good).
121. See generally Kreider, supra note 120, at 372-74 (discussing how prior to the
implementation of the program in states that have adopted IOLTA programs, issues
raising concerns about the ethical ramifications of lawyers participating in the IOLTA
program had to be resolved).
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on can prove difficult, if not dangerous: Not only does it expose one's
true intentions, it also demands greater intellectual rigor in the defense of one's position.
The lack of an explicit justification in these various papers may be
explained for a variety of reasons. The most favorable would be that
an absence of this sort of discussion may be attributed to a desire for
academic rigor. Thus, that which does not, directly or indirectly, refer
to specific statutes, cases, or other papers should not be discussed, at
least not at any length. Instead, these discussions focus solely on legal
reasoning, never referencing the ethical/jurisprudential principles on
which legal reasoning ultimately depends.
A less favorable explanation, however, for such an absence might
be attributable to a disregard for those fields of inquiry (jurisprudence, ethics and political philosophy) that make the legal field possible. Such a disregard may suggest a number of different beliefs held
by the supporters of IOLTAs. One such belief might be the lack of
necessity to discuss such matters. That is, the supporters of IOLTAs
may believe the various ethical points have been conceded by those
who seek to abolish IOLTAs. If this is the case, the responsibility for
the absence of such a discussion falls on those who seek to defend the
property rights of those who have been compelled to contribute to the
IOLTAs. Indeed, an article that takes up the defense of clients forced
to pay into the IOLTA, seems to have open disdain for the attempted
use of political philosophy and ethics in this on-going debate.122 Such
an attitude will only serve to encourage the supporters of IOLTAs.
Leaving all moral pronouncements to the supporters of IOLTAs implies the lack of a moral position for those who seek to end the
IOLTA programs. Instead, those who wish to end IOLTAs should
counter the ethical arguments of supporters of the IOLTA programs.
This will not cause a degeneration of the debate. Rather, it will demand, of both sides, a rigorous and strict method of legal reasoning
that shows itself to be in accord with the principles on which it relies.
Without reference to such principles, opportunities for legal gamesmanship will arise.
CONCLUSION

The IOLTA program seeks to distinguish between the owners of
principal and the owners of interest earned on that principal. In defending such a distinction, the First and Eleventh Circuits have created an inappropriate and unsupportable position: the net value
argument. In so doing, both federal circuits have ignored a key
122. See Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Social Investing, IOLTA and the Law of Trusts:
The Settlor's Case Against the PoliticalUse of Charitableand Client Funds, 22 Loy. U.
CHI.

L.J. 163, 166 (1990).
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Supreme Court ruling. Consistency, as well as fairness, requires all
federal circuits to align themselves with Webb's.
At a minimum, the IOLTA programs should be switched from
mandatory to voluntary participation. A voluntary program would
keep attorneys from the uncomfortable, if not unethical,' 23 position of
using a client's money in a manner not in accordance with the client's
wishes. Further, the attorney would no longer be a collector of revenue for the state. Placing the attorney in such a role will likely result
in greater regulation by the state (via the state bar) of the legal profession. The attorney who does decide to participate in the IOLTA program will undoubtably incur costs greater than when the program was
mandatory. Such an attorney may lose clients who do not wish their
money to be used by the state. If the attorney opts to have both participating and non-participating clients, such an attorney will face increased cost and headaches from the various accounting issues that
will likely arise. What bears pointing out is that the attorney and the
client will be in a position to determine their own economic fate. The
IOLTA programs, to a limited extent, deny such economic selfdetermination.
More importantly, the client's use of an attorney, and presumably
the court system, would not leave the client helpless before the state.
One normally consults an attorney for the protection of one's rights
and interests, not their further abridgment. Should the program be
ordered to adopt (in some cases, re-adopt) voluntary participation, attorneys should be required to disclose to clients whether they intend
to participate in such a program. The attorneys would be in a position
to follow not only their own political dictates but also their own economic self-interest. The clients, the owners of principal, would then
be in a position to exercise control over their own money-a control
they should have never been denied.
Dan Chern

123. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.15 (1997) (setting
forth rules for keeping a client's property, making it unethical to commingle the client's and attorney's property, and to deliver any funds to the client as directed by the
client, with exceptions as stated in the law).
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